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THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE BASE AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON TECHNOLOGY COLLABORATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates how an incumbent company’s internal characteristics influence its 
propensity to form learning alliances. A firm may be reluctant to enter a research alliance when it 
has deep knowledge in a certain technological field due to concerns about knowledge leakage 
and the low possibility of being able to learn much from collaboration. On the contrary, when the 
firm has a broad knowledge base, it may have high propensity to enter alliances due to more self-
confidence in its ability to learn fast from partners. In addition, we argue that when a firm 
concentrates its R&D at a central location, this neutralizes the positive and negative influences of 
the two knowledge base features on alliance formation. We tested and found support for the 
hypotheses using a database of 1,550 alliances undertaken by 78 large incumbent pharmaceutical, 
chemical and agro-food companies active in the biotechnology sector during 1993 to 2002.  
Keywords:  
Biotechnology, knowledge base, organizational structure, strategic alliance 
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INTRODUCTION  
Collaborative activity has long been seen as beneficial to technological development (Ettlie & 
Pavlou, 2006; Quinn, 2000). Alliances allow complementary assets to be exploited (Das & Teng, 
2000; Tsang, 2000); but more importantly, alliances provide invaluable opportunities for firms to 
learn or access new knowledge in a more effective way (Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Dyer & 
Nobeoka, 2000; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). The latter perspective of organizational learning is 
particularly useful in explaining research collaboration by large incumbent firms in industries 
that experience technological revolution (Rothaermel, 2001). For instance, in the 
biopharmaceutical sector, many incumbent pharmaceutical companies build up their 
biotechnological knowledge base through working with new biotech firms (NBFs) or universities 
(Pangarkar, 2009; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2007; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). 
Past writers have stressed that technology (research) collaboration can also bring dangers. 
Apart for the obvious danger that the costs of making collaboration outweigh the value of the 
knowledge, the main concern is competition within cooperative relationships. A firm may enter 
alliances primarily to learn a partner’s know how in order to become a more effective competitor 
(Hamel, 1991), and hence the partner that is slow in the learning race finds itself in a great 
disadvantage in either gaining benefits from the collaboration or competing against its winning 
partner in the market place (Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 2002; Teece, 1986). This means that 
research partnerships are not unambiguously welcome.  
In unpicking the dimensions of the value equation, some prior studies framed the problem 
as one of learning about knowledge. There are three major groups of studies examining the 
relationship between knowledge and alliance formation. The first group has highlighted the 
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effects of quantity or magnitude of a firm’s knowledge base, for instance the number of research 
pipelines (Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006), on alliance behavior. While some studies have found a 
positive effect (e.g., Kinder, 2003; Quinn, 2000), some found a negative one (Harrigan, 1985; 
Pisano, 1990), and some did not find a constant effect at all (e.g., Mol, 2005). The second group 
has focused on the different types of knowledge to be transferred or created in the learning 
process, such as tacit versus explicit knowledge (Dhanaraj et al, 2004; Inkpen & Wang, 2006; 
Nielsen & Nielsen, 2009), ambiguous knowledge (Simonin, 1999), and embedded knowledge 
(Tsang, 2000). Although these studies have described the learning process, they have not 
explained why a firm allies with other organizations. The third group has studied the question of 
who allies with whom by examining the relationships of knowledge features between alliance 
partners. They have focused on similarity of firms’ technological knowledge (e.g., measured by 
patent cross-citation by Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007) and similarity of firms’ knowledge 
processing methods (e.g., measured by compensation practice by Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). 
However, thus far “few studies explicitly account for a firm’s knowledge structuration within 
organizational boundaries” (George, Kotha and Zheng, 2008: 1451) in alliance formation 
research. In other words, the literature has paid little attention to the features of a firm’s 
knowledge base in its propensity to form alliances. As a result, we still do not have a good 
understanding of why some firms have more alliances than the others.  
To fill this research gap, in this study we compare the value of the two opposing logics – 
alliances as beneficial or detrimental — by examining two important firm knowledge features: 
depth and breadth. We propose that when a firm’s technological knowledge is deep (Wang & 
von Tunzelmann, 2000), collaboration may be discouraged, due to the greater risks of knowledge 
being disclosed and the lower chances of benefiting from learning from partners. However, when 
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a firm possesses broad knowledge, it may seek for more alliances. There are two reasons: first, 
broad knowledge may be associated with architectural knowledge, which is hard for the partners 
to steal (Brusoni et al., 2001); and second, such broadness may increase the firm’s absorptive 
capacity, enhancing the ability to integrate knowledge from its partners into a novel use in new 
product development (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
 The technological knowledge of the firm can be categorized along another dimension: 
whether it is centralized into a single division at a single place or dispersed among many 
different units in different locations. Previous studies have suggested that organizational 
structure (centralized or decentralized) can have an impact on firm’s search and innovation 
activities (Ambos et al., 2008; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003), especially in turbulent and 
complex environments (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005; Volberda, 1996), and that centralized R&D 
may generate innovation that has a broader and larger impact on the subsequent technological 
evolution (Argyres & Silverman, 2004). However, the linkage between R&D organization and 
alliances has been overlooked.  
We know that organizational structure may influence decision making process including 
external technology collaboration (Fredrickson, 1986); and we also know that alliances are a 
very powerful and popular tool for search and innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Dyer 
& Nobeoka, 2000; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004), so we explore in this study whether a firm’s 
alliance behavior could be a very important mechanism through which organizational structure 
affects firm’s search and innovation activities. In our exploration, we not only examine the direct 
effect of R&D organizational structure on alliance formation; but more importantly, we focus on 
the moderating role of R&D structure on the effects of a firm’s knowledge features on its 
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propensity to form alliances. We argue that when a firm’s R&D is centrally located, the more 
efficient communication between labs and tighter control by headquarters may reduce concerns 
about problems such as knowledge leakage and innovation appropriation associated with deep 
knowledge bases, thus tending to alleviate the negative effect of knowledge depth on alliance 
formation. Likewise, centralized R&D facilities will also tend to reduce the positive effect of 
knowledge breadth on alliance formation. The main reason is that since both broad knowledge 
and centralized R&D structure act to increase firms’ absorptive capacity and in-house 
development capability, they may substitute for each other in order to reduce the costs and risks 
involved in alliances. We conclude that a centralized R&D structure plays a role of a “cushion” 
that buffers any strong influences of firm knowledge features on alliance formation.  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Learning Alliances and the Firm’s Technological Capability Development 
Over the past two decades there has been a global proliferation of strategic alliances. The 
research on understanding the motivations of alliance formation has also developed substantially 
in this period. Since Teece’s seminal work in 1986, alliances have been regarded as one of the 
most effective mechanisms for firms to access specialized complementary assets (by e.g., Das & 
Teng, 2000). This would explain the growth in alliance formation between large incumbent 
companies possessing strong marketing resources and new technological firms with distinctive 
technological competencies (often related to a new product) designed to benefit both partners in 
the product commercialization process. However, in recent years, more and more researchers 
have suggested another important explanatory factor for the growth in strategic alliances – as 
platforms for organizational learning (see the review by Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). Organizational 
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learning theory suggests that incumbent companies attempt to learn new knowledge from their 
alliance partners and internalize the knowledge to build up their own internal competencies.  
Although access to both complementary assets and organizational learning opportunities 
can drive alliance formation, they may work differently in different types of alliances. 
Rothaermel (2001) noted that “organizational learning motivates exploration alliances, while 
access to complementarities motivates exploitation alliances” (p. 690). Exploration alliances 
focus on the upstream stages of research and technological innovation, while exploitation 
alliances are market-oriented alliances in the downstream commercialization stage (Koza & 
Lewin, 1998). Colombo et al. (2006) confirmed Rothaermel’s argument from a large sample of 
Italian high-tech firms.  
Since this study focuses on research alliances, we apply the organizational learning 
perspective to explain alliance formation. The literature on open innovation suggested that, in a 
dynamic environment, firms use a wide range of external actors as partners (including suppliers, 
customers, consultants and universities etc) to help them achieve and sustain innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Incumbent companies may pursue external 
knowledge acquisition to replenish their research pipelines (Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006). For 
instance, although Merck & Co. has long led the way in such fields as atherosclerosis and 
cardiovascular disease, alliances have enabled it to increase its effectiveness in the area of 
diabetes, obesity, neuroscience and oncology - areas where patients’ needs are projected to surge 
in the coming decades. Taking the example of their research in oncology, Merck & Co. allied 
with seven partners in the 10 years from 1995, and has announced nine oncology programs and 
candidates in various stages of development, mostly derived from research alliances (Demain, 
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2005). Such “learning alliances” can allow firms to accelerate their technological capability 
development while at the same time minimizing their exposure to technological uncertainties 
(Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004).  
Previous empirical studies on strategic alliances have analyzed many firm-specific 
determinants of alliance formation. They have highlighted the influences of such variables as 
firm size, level of R&D expenses, prior outcomes of firms’ innovative activities and firms’ social 
capital as accumulated from their network of prior collaborative relations (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; 
Belderbos et al., 2004; Colombo et al., 2006; Fritsch & Lukas, 2001; Hagedoorn, Link & 
Vonortas, 2000; Tether, 2002). Despite the length of the list, we need a better appreciation of the 
role of cumulated knowledge and its dimensions. Since learning is a cumulative and path-
dependent process (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), we expect the characteristics of a firm’s existing 
knowledge base to influence its future learning behavior, and so its motivation to form learning 
alliances. The next section explores how these characteristics operate.  
Two Dimensions of Technological Knowledge Base: Depth and Breadth  
Describing a firm’s existing technological knowledge base is not easy, as research is a complex 
activity (Collins, 1985). One can think of fields of technological knowledge as mapping onto a 
multi-dimensional landscape (Kauffman et al., 2000). Drawing from George, Kotha and Zheng 
(2008), we define the depth of a technological knowledge base as its level of expertise within a 
technological territory. Deep knowledge allows a firm to understand casual linkage of the old 
components within the territory (March, 1991). It also enables the firm to make new 
combinations from old components, as the firm understands the limitations of existing 
components from repeated use. So deep understanding in one particular technological territory 
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not only provides expertise in solving one specific type of question, but also supports its 
engagement in exploring new applications of the technology (George et al., 2008). Hence we 
argue (like others) that  knowledge depth is a critical measure that reflects both a firm’s 
technological capability and its desire to explore new technological knowledge applications. 
Breadth of technological knowledge base refers to the range of technological knowledge 
areas that have to be investigated to develop particular subjects (Wang & von Tunzelmann, 
2000). As a measure, breadth captures the extent to which knowledge is adjacent and relevant to 
the research in question. A firm with a broad knowledge base is familiar with many territories on 
the technological knowledge landscape, and is thus capable of exploring more paths and into 
new regions (Kauffman et al., 2000). As with the measure of knowledge depth, studies have also 
found that firms with “broad” knowledge seek to improve their positions with further search 
(Brusoni et al., 2001), and breadth is thus another dimension of a firm’s technological knowledge 
base that influences its exploration for new technological development, which can be seen as 
“orthogonal” to the depth dimension.  
Depth of Technological Knowledge Base and Alliance Formation 
When an incumbent company’s technological knowledge base in a particular area is deeper than 
its competitors, it is more attractive to potential partners, and hence the opportunities it has of 
forming alliances are increased (Ahuja, 2000). Most firms find that making their knowledge 
deeper is difficult, since technological uncertainties combine to raise the hurdles that firms must 
overcome (Mitchell & Singh, 1992), so alliances are an attractive resolution to this challenge. 
Just as PhD students find it attractive to work with leading scholars, so accumulated 
technological competence in a particular area will signal a firm as attractive to others hoping to 
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acquire greater knowledge through partnerships (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Baum et al., 2000; 
Stuart, 1998).  
 From the point of view of an incumbent company with a substantial technological 
knowledge base, deep knowledge may exert a contradictory influence on its willingness to enter 
into a research alliance, and redeployment of internal resources or outright acquisitions may 
often seem a better option than external alliances (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Since 
technological knowledge is a key competitive asset of a firm in R&D intensive industries, 
knowledge sharing may undermine competitive advantages and industry position (Conner & 
Prahalad, 1996; Inkpen & Tsang, 2007). Except in a few cases, such a well-endowed firm may 
stand to learn much less from its partners than its partners can learn from it (Ahuja, 2000; 
Larsson et al., 1998). Such alliances can carry an increased risk of opportunism (Williamson, 
1985), and De Carolis (2003) has provided empirical evidence about the negative effects on a 
firm’s performance of being imitated by its rivals. Moreover, innovative activities at the 
explorative stage may be harder to appropriate fairly between the partners because of the tacit 
nature of the knowledge both employed and generated during technological collaborative 
processes (Colombo et al., 2006; Pisano, 1990; Teece, 1986). Finally, collaboration can distract 
management attention (Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003), incur alliance transaction costs (Gulati, 
1995) and create isomorphic pressure for innovative firms (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). Given 
the relatively limited benefits of collaboration and the relatively high costs of forming linkages, 
it is likely that a firm possessing a deep technological knowledge base will be less inclined to use 
alliances, even though its high levels of endowments may make it attractive to many partners. 
Based on this argument, we predict the first hypothesis: 
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H1: For incumbent companies, the depth of a technological knowledge base is 
negatively related to the likelihood of forming research alliances.  
 
Breadth of Technological Knowledge Base and Alliance Formation 
A broad technological knowledge base supports incumbent companies when they use research 
alliances. First, firms with a broad technological knowledge base are better able to monitor 
changes in technology market and discover-recognize new opportunities that deserve exploration 
(George et al., 2008). Such firms are also better more able to assess the value of new 
technological projects offered by the prospective partners, and thus have more incentive to invest 
in exploring new technological opportunities with partners (Arora & Gambardella, 1990). 
Second, firms with a broad knowledge base may gain more from alliance learning. Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) argued that knowledge broadness increases “absorptive capacity” and facilitates 
the innovative process by enabling organizations to make novel associations and linkages. In an 
industry experiencing radical technological innovation (such as biotechnology), since the new 
technological knowledge is dispersed in industrial networks, firms need to collaborate with 
others to explore the opportunities fully (Powell et al., 1996). A broad knowledge base allows the 
firm to build up architectural knowledge competence, integrating and linking dispersed 
knowledge from partner firms together into a coherent whole (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). 
Finally, firms with a broad technological knowledge base may gain optimal economical 
performance where they can replenish their broad product lines to realize the economics of scope 
in the exploitation of their technologies (Piscitello, 2000; 2004). 
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Strategic alliance literature has provided empirical evidence supporting the value of 
broad technological knowledge bases in the setting up of research alliances. We note here the 
work of Henderson (1994) with cardiovascular drug discovery sector data, Orsenigo, Pammolli 
and Riccaboni (2001) with biotech industry data, Brusoni et al. (2001) with aircraft engine 
control systems data, and Mowery, Oxley and Silverman (1996) with cross-sectional data. All of 
them have found that established multi-technology R&D intensive firms are very capable of 
absorbing new knowledge and techniques generated outside their firm boundaries, despite the 
fact that major technological discontinuities and breakthroughs initially result in the growth of 
specialized technology producers. The mechanisms described above suggest the positive impact 
of breadth in an existing knowledge base on the formation of research alliances.  
 But do firms with a strongly broad knowledge base have diminished incentives to 
forming an alliance on competitive grounds? Broad knowledge is likely to be difficult to 
replicate because it encompasses knowledge about how components of systems interact, and 
tends to reside in informal communication channels and “information filters” shared by local 
R&D groups (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Lave & Wenger, 1991). Moreover, in a “learning race”, 
firms with a broad knowledge base can learn at a faster rate than their partners (Hamel, 1991), as 
their strong absorptive capacity increases their capabilities in building linkages between new 
knowledge and their existing knowledge base. Therefore, firms with a broad knowledge base 
have more confidence that they face lower levels of challenge that their knowledge may be 
replicated by their partners, and that the likely positive effects in alliances will outweigh any 
negative ones. 
H2: For incumbent companies, the breadth of a technological knowledge base is 
positively related to the likelihood of forming research alliances.  
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R&D Organizational Design and Alliance Formation 
 Different R&D activity locations are associated with different attitudes to technological 
knowledge and hence research alliances. The literature has suggested that organizational 
structure influences the R&D development path (Argyres, 1996; Argyres & Silverman, 2004). 
When R&D is centrally controlled and located in a single place, corporate managers are likely to 
be concerned with its technological evolution (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). In contrast, when 
R&D is decentralized across different divisions, perhaps in different locations, the managers 
making alliance decisions may be more locally based, and the technological development based 
on the alliances may be more influenced by the specific demands of the existing context, perhaps 
ignoring the long term technological development goals of the wider firm (Chacar & Lieberman, 
2003). Moreover, in a decentralized structure, there may be substantial coordination costs that 
impede optimal working, even where managers wish to pursue the collective interest. Such 
managers have to collect the necessary information and make a guess as to the loss of short term 
benefits (as potential alliance failure may lead to lower personal rewards). The difficulties of 
coordination are a well known problem stemming from physical separation (Kogut & Zander, 
1992). Overall the literature seems to suggest that a centralized R&D organizational structure 
may encourage more research alliances aimed at exploring new technological opportunities 
(Zhang, Baden-Fuller & Mangematin, 2007).  
 Moving beyond the direct effect of the R&D structure on alliance formation, this study 
focuses on the moderating role of R&D structure on the negative/positive relationship between a 
firm’s knowledge depth/breadth and its propensity to form alliances. First, we predict that a 
centralized R&D structure may alleviate the negative effect of knowledge depth on alliance 
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formation. As aforementioned (compared with a decentralized structure), in a centralized R&D 
structure the corporate managers will tend to be more alert and ready to act on new technological 
opportunities in the market. The literature has also suggested that centralized R&D management 
may be better placed to prevent leakages of important knowledge to partners during the learning 
process, owing to the richer alliance experience it has accumulated from managing a portfolio of 
alliances (Dunning, 1994) and its better internal communication (Jansen et al., 2005). Corporate 
managers are also more likely to be experienced in designing alliance contracts that succeed in 
securing innovation appropriation from learning alliances (Baden-Fuller et al., 2006; Reuer & 
Tong, 2005). Therefore, compared with managers in a decentralized R&D organization, 
corporate managers in centralized R&D organizations will have less concern about losing their 
technological competence and more confidence in their ability to gain from alliances, which are 
particular concerns when the firm has deep knowledge base. The deeper the technological 
knowledge base of the company, the more such concerns the managers may have, and thus the 
more valuable a centralized R&D structure can become in alleviating them. 
H3a: The negative relationship between an incumbent company’s technological 
knowledge depth and its propensity to form alliances is weaker in a centralized 
R&D structure than in a decentralized structure.  
Second, we predict that a centralized R&D structure may also lessen the positive effect of 
a firm’s technological knowledge breadth on its propensity to form alliances. The alliance 
literature has argued that a firm’s in-house development capability may substitute for research 
alliances where there are concerns about knowledge leakage and innovation appropriation 
(Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Therefore, a firm that has strong in-house 
R&D development may have a lower incentive to use alliances. The literature has also suggested 
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that a centralized R&D may facilitate internal communication between researchers (Argyres & 
Silverman, 2004), increasing the absorptive capacity of the research team as a whole, thus 
contributing further towards stronger in-house development capabilities. Thus, a centralized 
R&D structure and a broad technological knowledge base may substitute to each other in their 
positive effects on alliance formation. 
H3b: The positive relationship between an incumbent company’s technological 
knowledge breadth and its propensity to form alliances is weaker in a centralized 
R&D structure than in a decentralized structure.  
METHODS 
Research Setting 
The research context is that of large incumbent pharmaceutical, chemical and agro-food 
companies active in the biotechnology sector in Europe, Japan and North America. Three 
considerations motivated the choice of biotechnology sector as the setting of the study. First, this 
sector has been identified as one of the sectors subject to radical technological innovation 
(Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006; Hopkins et al., 2007), and as having a high level of research 
intensity making it an ideal context to analyze research activities (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Second, 
biotechnology consists of a set of scientific principles and associated techniques (e.g., cell and 
molecular biology, genomics, proteomics and microarray technology) that provide firms with 
new research solutions and productive activities across several technological areas, including 
pharmaceuticals, chemical, agriculture, food and industrial and environmental applications (BIO, 
2004). Hence, we may observe variation in the profiles of incumbent companies’ technological 
knowledge bases in terms of their processes for integrating biotechnology with their existing 
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knowledge base. Third, as new technological knowledge in the biotechnology sector is dispersed 
among incumbent companies, new biotechnology firms (NBFs) and universities/research 
institutes, the sector is characterized by very high levels of alliance activity (Powell et al., 1996). 
The literature has found that the major motivation behind incumbent companies entering 
alliances with NBFs is to replenish their research pipelines (De Carolis, 2003; Hopkins et al., 
2007): on average, such companies spend appropriately 14% of their R&D budget externally 
(Myers & Baker, 2001). Although some studies have observed the impact of alliances on 
innovation performance in this sector (e.g., Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), few 
studies have examined how and why the alliances are formed. 
Population-Sample 
As indicated above, the research-subjects of this study are the large pharmaceutical (human 
therapeutics and diagnostics), chemical and agro-food companies that actively use biotechnology 
knowledge in their R&D. We identified a population which consists of 78 companies most active 
in terms of U.S. biotechnology patent applications as retrieved by the Derwent Biotechnology 
Abstract (DBA) database. The DBA covers all biotechnology patent applications since 1981, and 
provides 12 technology classes and 30 sub-classes in the biotechnology sector (see Appendix). 
We classified the companies into the three industries according to their SCI codes retrieved from 
the database of “Business & Company Resource Center”. The pharmaceutical companies are 
those in the industry group 283 “Drugs”, the agro-food companies are those in the group 287 
“Agricultural Chemicals”, and the chemical companies are those in the rest of the sub-groups 
under the SIC code 28 “Chemicals and Allied Products”, which includes six sub-groups such as 
281 “Industrial Inorganic Chemicals”. 
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We believe our “population-sample” has covered most incumbent companies active in 
biotechnology area: as our sample includes 61 pharmaceutical companies, compared to prior 
major studies by Rothaermel (2001) and Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) which identified 32 large 
and 59 incumbent pharmaceutical firms respectively, we believe it demonstrates extensive 
coverage, at least in the pharmaceutical area. These 78 firms are also good representatives of 
incumbent companies in terms of their substantial R&D investment levels that average over $33 
millions a firm and over $1,000 per employee.  
Dependent Variable: New Alliances 
The dependent variable is the number of new research alliances formed by each sample firm in 
each year. We used the online industry database BioCentury, which reports and classifies 
biotechnological firms’ press releases, to retrieve firm alliance data from 1993 to 2002. This 
database offers comprehensive coverage of U.S. and foreign companies actively involved in 
biotech R&D, and is highly reputed and considered as reliable among industrial practitioners, 
although little used by academic researchers because of its high fees. We included the alliances 
of all a sample firm’s divisions and subsidiaries by referring to the U.S., UK and Ireland, 
Continental Europe, and Asia editions of Who Owns Whom and the Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations. 1993 was adopted as the starting year because the biotechnology industry has 
mushroomed since 1992, with U.S. revenues increasing from $8 billion in 1992 to $39.2 billion 
in 2003 (BIO, 2004).  
We first collected data on both research and commercialization alliances 
(commercialization alliance becomes one control variable in data analysis), identifying 3,158 
alliances and identified the alliance partner(s) and the alliance type for each. In total, 1,042 
J. Zhang, C. Baden-Fuller, 2010, The Influence Of Technological Knowledge Base And Organizational Structure On Technology 
Collaboration Journal of Management Studies 47(4): 676-704 
 18 
partners were involved: only two organizations joined in more than 20 alliances (27 and 24 
respectively), 23 organizations joined in 10-20 alliances, 405 organizations joined in 2-9 
alliances, and 612 organizations appeared only once. We cleaned the database by deleting the 
alliances in which both parties were in our sample list (such as the alliance between Merck and 
SmithKline Beecham in 1996), in order to keep only NBFs as alliance partners, so the 
motivations for our focal firms entering alliances were comparable. (Two large incumbents may 
form an alliance for purposes that are different from learning from NBF partners: such as sharing 
risks (Ohmae, 1989), entering new markets and technologies (Kogut, 1991) and collectively 
monopolizing a drug market (Porter & Fuller, 1986).) We also excluded the alliances where the 
partners were research institutes or universities. The remaining alliances are those between big 
incumbents and biotechnology companies. Cleaning the database excluded 226 alliances 
involving 52 focal firms and 23 alliances involving 16 universities/research institutes. It left 
2,909 alliances which are comparable based on having the same (organizational learning) 
alliance motivation, the focus of our study.  
In the second step, we separated research alliances from commercialization alliances. For 
the 2,552 alliances in the pharmaceutical industry, we followed Koza and Lewin’s notion and 
Rothaermel’s (2001) and Rothaermel and Deeds’s (2004) empirical work in coding alliances 
focusing on basic research, drug discovery and pre-clinical trials as research alliances, and those 
targeting towards drug development, clinical trials, manufacturing, FDA approval and marketing 
and sales as commercialization alliances. For the 357 alliances in the chemical and agro-food 
industries, we followed prior literature (e.g., Mitchell & Singh, 1992) in classifying them into 
research alliances if they were based on research contracts or to the commercialization group if 
they were market-oriented (i.e., towards manufacturing, marketing or sales). We checked our 
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coding using second researchers to examine about 50 percent of the data points; and we found 
the inter-rater reliability was 0.92 - well above the conventional 0.70 cut-off point (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983). Our classification of the 2,909 alliances revealed 1,550 research alliances – which 
became the final pool used in the data analysis, and 1,359 commercialization alliances – which 
were included as one control variable in the models. 
Independent Variable: Technological Knowledge Base 
For more than a decade, scholars have used patent data as a proxy measure for a firm’s stock of 
knowledge (e.g., De Carolis & Deeds, 1999; Hall, Jeffe & Trajtenberg, 2001; Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994; Zucker, Darby & Armstrong, 2002). It was particularly true in the 
biotechnology sector (e.g., De Carolis, 2003; Foltz, Barham & Kim, 2002; Gittelman & Kogut, 
2003; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). As innovative firms create temporary monopolies based on 
proprietary inventions protected by patents, and biotechnology is clearly a vital competence for 
innovation in our sample firms, biotechnology patents play a central role in their strategies (De 
Carolis, 2003). Since by definition a patent describes both a technical problem and a solution to 
that problem (Walker, 1995); analyzing patent data can provide a consistent chronology of firms’ 
knowledge accumulation (Shan, Walker & Kogut, 1994). In our study, patents are especially 
appropriate to measure the features of firm knowledge, because the DBA classes allow us to 
classify the knowledge embodied in a patent to knowledge classes very easily, and this 
classification can be used to indicate both depth and breadth.  
For both the depth and breadth variables, we composed data for the years 1992 through to 
2001, a one year lag before the dependent variable. In approaching the use of patent data we paid 
considerable attention to the fact that the value of knowledge may decay over time. All of our 
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knowledge stock variables are calculated on a lagged basis using the “permanent inventory 
method” (Ahuja, 2000), which has been broadly used as a reasonable approach for the fast-
moving biotechnology industry. We take a 5-year window of prior patents for each firm and each 
year as a method of roughly assessing the currency of a firm’s stock of knowledge, a method 
consistent with prior research (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Thus the stock of 
knowledge for any firm in year 1992, for instance, is calculated as the sum of the patents granted 
to the firm in the years between 1988 and 1992 (the DBA covers data since 1981) depreciated at 
an annual rate of 20% (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). The 5-year window for patenting 
attenuates any annual fluctuations, and thus captures a firm’s patenting propensity more 
accurately. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that a firm’s decision to entering alliances is 
based on the stock of its knowledge base (De Carolis & Deeds, 1999; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 
2004).  
We measured the depth of the knowledge base by following prior studies (e.g., Cantwell 
& Piscitello 2000; Patel & Pavitt, 1991; Soete, 1987). The patterns of firm technological 
knowledge depth can be compared on the basis of a number of different indicators. Generally, 
knowledge depth is a measure of concentration, and is computed in two steps. In the first step, 























where P is the number of patents held by firm i in technology class t. In other terms, Eq.(1) is the 
ratio of the share of firm i patents falling in technology class t, over the share of all patents 
falling in that technology class. This can be interpreted as an index of “comparative advantage”: 
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a value above unity indicates an area of relative strength and a value below unity an area of 
relative weakness. The definition of the index implies that its value is necessarily null or positive 
but is not bound by an upper limit. In the second step, we compute the coefficient of variation of 
all the firm’s RTA measures: 
  RTARTADepth   (2) 
Eq.(2) says that the depth of the firm’s knowledge base is high when the firm has 
developed a high relative technological advantage in one or few technology classes, whereas a 
vector of equal RTA values would produce a relatively low measure of depth 1.  
We measured the breadth of knowledge base by counting the number of technological 
sub-classes in DBA classification (see Appendix) in which the firm has been granted patents in 
the 5-year window.  
Independent Variable: R&D Organizational Structure  
We followed the previous studies in measuring the centralization of R&D organizational 
structure (Argyres, 1996; Argyres & Silverman, 2004) using data collected from various sources. 
The Directory of American Research and Technology (1991-1998), which contains information 
on the sizes of the technical staffs of R&D laboratories and the way they are organized, was the 
primary information source for American sample firms. For those firms that did not release such 
information, we estimated the size of each lab based on the number of R&D fields listed for the 
lab, which is highly correlated with staff numbers (Argyres & Silverman, 2004). Enlightened by 
their suggested method, we categorized a firm’s R&D structure as “centralized”, if the ratio of 
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corporate to divisional researchers was greater than 1; otherwise, the structure was categorized as 
“decentralized”. A centralized structure is typically characterized by a relatively large corporate 
lab located at corporate headquarters (with single reporting lines), and relatively small (or even 
no) divisional labs elsewhere. By contrast, a decentralized structure has large divisional labs – 
often located within separately incorporated division(s) – and a relatively small central lab. 
These firms generally appear to have grown largely by acquisition 2. Essentially, the R&D 
structure of all firms remained constant over the years 1991-1998 (the period covered by the 
directory). We checked company annual reports, and 10-K statements and company histories 
when available, and found similar result for the years 1999-20013. Hence, the dummy variable 
centralization was constant over the research years 1992-2001 for each firm. We used the 
Directory of European Research and Development in various years, and a Classified Directory of 
Japanese Periodicals to collect information about the European and Japanese firms, again 
verifying the data from company annual reports and 10-K statements, company histories when 
available, and newspapers and magazines articles. The measure is principally based on the nature 
of the definition, as aforementioned. To check the validity of the data, we compared ours with 
those of Argyres and Silverman (2004). 75% of the American firms in our sample had 
centralized R&D, a figure that was close to the 70% ratio in their research, supporting our 
measurement to some extent. 83% of the European firms in our sample were categorized as 
having centralized R&D structures, as were 70% of the Japanese firms.  
Control variables  
We introduced a number of control variables in line with previous researchers’ methods. The 
first was R&D intensity, measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to the number of employees 
(a commonly used control). We also introduced Firm size, measured as the log value of the 
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number of its employees, as a control to reflect a firm’s capability as well as its incentive to form 
alliances (Ahuja, 2000). Previous research provided inconsistent findings: while some studies 
found positive impacts (e.g., Powell & Brantley, 1991), some found no influence (e.g., Shan et 
al., 1994).  
We controlled for national effects by adding two dummies Europe and Japan, while 
keeping U.S. companies as the reference group. There has been much debate about the relative 
efficiency and institutional structures of European versus U.S. firms in this industry, and recently 
the gap has been narrowed. Both industries have similar approaches to biotechnology. In contrast, 
Japanese firms have a different context and philosophy, and had no major biotech product 
approved by FDA (BIO, 2004) before 2003. There appears to be no real equivalent in Japan of 
the vibrant independent emerging U.S. and European biotechnology firm, and one would 
therefore expect Japanese firms to have fewer opportunities to form alliances, even if they had 
the motivation.  
To control for firm heterogeneity, we included two one-period-lagged variables, one is 
the dependent variable, and the other is the number of Commercialization alliances (Heckman & 
Borjas, 1980).  
It is believed that alliance behavior is a high market-pull process. The signal of strong 
market demand and growth stimulates investment by incumbent companies through partnering 
with NBFs. Literature has found that when equity markets are relatively hot, investors are overly 
optimistic about the potential of young firms (Ritter, 1984). Moreover, new firms tend to 
mushroom in a hot market, providing plenty of technology offers for big incumbent firms. To 
control for the influence of market conditions on alliance formation, we constructed a variable 
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called “stock market”. It is the average of the yearly average value of the NASDAQ 
Biotechnology Index (NASBOT) and NASDAQ Biotechnology Bloomberg Index (NASBOZ) 
stock market indexes from year 1992 to 2001.  
Finally, we controlled for industrial sector influences by including a dummy variable 
Pharmaceuticals, with the other industries (such as chemicals and agricultural food) being kept 
as the reference group. Incumbent companies in different industries face a variety of 
opportunities provided by different prospective alliance partners. The existence of different IPR 
regimes and the role of regulators in muting or intensifying competition, are two important 
forces that affect the rewards available to alliance firms (Teece, 1986). In addition, the 
technological achievements in some sectors have higher intrinsic growth rates than in others 
(Park, Chen & Gallagher, 2002). For instance, pharmaceutical companies have the highest value 
added in the biotech industry over this period (McNamara & Baden-Fuller, 2007), with the 
annual number of new biotech drug approvals increasing from 7 in 1993 to 37 in 2003, and sales 
from US$7 billion in 1993 to US$28.4 billion in 2003. We predict that, in such sectors, firms are 
more likely to be active in forming alliances to seek supernormal economic rents. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables, showing that the typical 
firm formed about two research alliances each year. We first used a Poisson regression to test the 
hypotheses, because our dependent variable is counts of alliances, which takes only discrete non-
negative integer values (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). Moreover, our dependent variable included 
a large number of zero values, where a firm formed no alliance in a particular year. A Poisson 
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regression can ensure that such zero values are incorporated into a model, rather than being 
implicitly truncated as they are in the OLS regression (Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
We also applied negative binomial models to test the same models. Like Poisson 
regression, the negative binominal model treats the dependent variable as a count variable, but 
allows for a direct measure of heterogeneity (See Cameron & Trivedi, 1986). Estimating 
heterogeneity not only relaxes the stringent Poisson assumption of equal mean and variance in 
the error term, but also accounts for omitted variable bias (Walker et al., 1997). There were no 
substantial differences to our results, and we therefore report our results using only negative 
binomial models.  
Table 2 depicts our main statistical results. Using the usual style of reporting, model 1 
shows the effect of using the control variables without any of the independent variables; and 
models 2, 3 and 4 show the effect of introducing each of the independent variables depth, 
breadth and centralization separately. In each case, our independent variables add explanatory 
power. Model 5, with all three independent variables together, shows that the results are robust. 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 argued that the two dimensions of knowledge - depth and breadth 
- should have opposing effects on the propensity of incumbent firms to form alliances. Depth 
should decrease the likelihood of making an alliance, whereas breadth should increase this 
likelihood. These results are supported by our regressions, which show that the knowledge 
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variables bear different signs (although it should be noted that the breadth effect seems to be 
stronger than the depth effect).  
Our theorizing also predicts that the organization of R&D within the firm (centralization) 
should also influence the results. This theorizing stressed that centralization should appear as an 
interaction effect. Models 6 and 7 show how this interaction term influences each dimension of 
knowledge separately; and Model 8 shows how they work together. The results are even clearer 
than before. Not only do the depth and breadth of knowledge base continue to work in opposite 
directions (as forecasted in H1 and H2), but centralization moderates both effects in a manner 
that H3a and H3b predicted. Centralized R&D structure alleviates the negative (positive) 
relationship between technological knowledge depth (breadth) and alliance formation. Although 
the directions of the two relationships remain unchanged, their magnitude is reduced when the 
R&D activities are more centrally organized.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 To better understand the nature of the statistical results, we graphically display the 
interaction in Figure 1 and Figure 2, in which the vertical axis represents the new alliances. We 
use 1 standard deviation below and above the mean as the range for knowledge depth (breadth) 
and centralization, and we constrain the other variables to their mean values (Aiken & West, 
1991). The figures indicate that overall knowledge depth (breadth) has negative(positive) 
impacts on alliance formation; but the impacts are weakened when centralization is high than 
low.  
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----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 Here 
----------------------------------------- 
Controls and Robustness 
Our models involving the control variables show some interesting insights. R&D intensity and 
firm size show significantly positive effects, although the influence of the former is both much 
stronger and more consistent. Market competitive dynamics (the stock market) also shows 
positive effect on alliance activity. The results support most studies in the technology 
management field (e.g., Arora & Gambardella, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kinder, 2003; Quinn, 
2000). The dummy coefficient for Europe does not appear to be significant, suggesting that the 
European context did not skew results. However, the Japanese dummy is significant and negative, 
as expected. Model 8 in Table 2 shows that those firms active in applying biotechnology to the 
pharmaceutical sector seem to be not more active in forming alliances than those firms operating 
in chemical, agricultural and food sectors, which justifies, to some extent, our method of mixing 
companies across industries. Finally the consistent and positive effects of the lagged dependent 
variable and the lagged variable commercialization alliance suggest the path-dependent nature of 
a firm’s research alliance strategy.  
Some robustness tests were undertaken. First, we were concerned that Japanese firms 
might not release alliance information as completely as their counterparts in Europe and U.S., 
but the BioCentury staff confirmed that Japanese firms were as active and open as their European 
and U.S. counterparts. We then tried first excluding the 32 Japanese firms from our sample, and 
second adding the product items of country dummies and the knowledge base variables into the 
models. In both cases the main results appeared to be substantially unchanged. 
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We also performed additional robustness checks on the other controls. For instance, we 
changed the measure of firm size from the log value of the number of employees to the log value 
of fixed assets, and the measure of R&D intensity from the ratio of R&D expenditure to the 
number of employees to the log value of R&D expenditure or the ratio of R&D expenditure to 
the value of fixed assets. We modified the models by excluding the lagged dependent variable, 
since this variable might absorb too much of the effects of firm features, and thus lead to the 
coefficients for the firm’s knowledge base being non-significant. Finally, we controlled for all 
the other timing factors by adding year dummies to change random-effect models to year-fixed-
effect models. None of these changes produced significant changes in the results: in sum, our 
results are robust to a satisfactory level.  
 
DISCUSSION  
Alliances have been broadly recognized as a way by which firms learn new knowledge. Our 
objective has been to shed light on how an incumbent company’s internal knowledge 
characteristics might influence this use of alliances. Past studies, such as Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2006) suggested that “internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition are 
complementary innovation activities” (p. 68), and highlighted the positive effects of a high level 
of internal R&D on firm’s external knowledge acquisition. We developed this theme further 
suggesting that the quantity of internal R&D, which Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) highlighted, 
is only one aspect, and that the quality of internal R&D (depth and breadth of knowledge base) is 
even more important. In particular, more knowledge, when it is deep may even have a negative 
effect on firm’s proclivity to form alliances, quite contrary to that study’s results.  
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Second, we have some new insights into the moderating effect of R&D organizational 
structure. We know that, in product competition, organizational structure has a powerful 
moderating effect on building dynamic capabilities (e.g. Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001), and some 
have also suggested that the organization of R&D effort has powerful consequences that go 
beyond merely internal considerations of efficiency (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991). Here, our study suggests that a centralized R&D structure (with co-located 
R&D) may encourage corporate managers to form alliances where they can better control any 
leakage of their deep knowledge base. However, when the firm has very strong in-house 
development capabilities, as indicated by a broad knowledge base, a centralized R&D structure 
may also serve to reduce corporate managers’ incentives to use alliances, and avoid the 
unnecessarily high cost and risks involved in their use. To some extent, a centralized R&D 
structure plays a role of a “cushion” buffering any strong influences of a firm’s knowledge base 
features - positive or negative - on the likelihood of it forming alliances. 
Third, this study improves our knowledge about how firm characteristics impact the 
relationship between internal knowledge base and external knowledge acquisition. Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2006) found that one firm characteristic – the extent to which the innovation process 
relies on basic R&D rather than suppliers or customers – strengthens the complementary 
relationship between internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition. In other words, if the 
firm is more reliant on basic R&D, it may benefit more from combining internal R&D with 
externally acquired knowledge. This finding is in line with our general proposition that firm 
characteristics (in this paper, R&D organizational structure) will moderate the direct effect of its 
internal knowledge base characteristics on its proclivity to acquire external knowledge. 
Therefore, like Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), our paper contributes to the literature in that it is 
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one of the first to examine which firm characteristics influence the relationship between its 
internal knowledge base and its external knowledge acquisition activities.  
We also believe our paper has important consequences for the way researchers should 
think about measuring technological knowledge. Many papers have suggested different ways of 
thinking about knowledge in general, and technological knowledge in particular. Most scholars 
have used inputs (such as R&D spend) or surrogates (assets) to measure technological 
knowledge when testing the impacts of technological knowledge on alliance formation. Some 
(Arora & Gambardella, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kinder, 2003; Quinn, 2000) found positive 
relationships, others negative relationships (Harrigan, 1985; Pisano, 1990), and some no 
relationships (Kleinknecht & Reijnen, 1992). A few reported more sophisticated and dynamic 
results (Colombo & Garrone, 1996; Mol, 2005). Our approach has been to look at outputs of the 
knowledge process as a metric of the firm’s position in the landscape, which we believe to be 
superior to looking at either inputs or surrogates. As learning is a path-dependent process, we 
suggest this approach can be both intuitively appealing and empirically useful.  
Our study offers important implications for the managers in both incumbent companies 
and small NBFs. For managers in incumbent companies, this study may help explains why some 
incumbent companies suffer from a declining pipeline (Hopkins et al., 2007; Mittra, 2007) – 
perhaps their managers over-estimate the risks from alliances. In biotechnology, the risks may be 
less than imagined as IP protection is strong (Gans et al., 2002). Such a conservative attitude by 
incumbent managers could be influenced by the knowledge features of the firms: they may over-
value their deep and narrow knowledge base. Our work suggests that there is some value in co-
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locating R&D; perhaps a centralized R&D structure may help managers overcome the perceived 
difficulties surrounding alliances as a form of learning.  
This study also has important suggestions for the way that small NBFs should think about 
their partnering strategies. Alliances are vitally important for small firms generally, and for 
smaller biotechnology firms in particular: the fundraising from deals with big firms in 2004 was 
roughly US$10 billion, almost half of the US$22.8 billion they raised in that year (Edelson & 
Brown, 2005). As the executive director of global licensing at AstraZeneca (a large 
pharmaceutical company) said: “Pharma is keen on sourcing innovation at all stages in order to 
augment its own programs”. However, he differentiated the partnering activities by noting that 
“[The small biotech specialists] should stay reasonable with the expectation of reward for 
licensing out their technologies” (Haan, 2004: A6). Our results amplify his comment: we point 
out how the small firm may find it hard to deal with large companies who have potentially 
strongly competitive knowledge bases. They should look to partners with complementary assets 
instead, where they have better chances of a good deal (Teece, 1986). 
Limitations and Future Studies 
Our paper has modeled competitive interactions in a technology intensive industry, looking at 
both firm and knowledge variables. The most obvious limitation is that the basic modeling may 
only be valid for industries where knowledge has clear property right protection. In some 
technology situations, where property right protection is poor, the tensions between collaboration 
and competition may play out differently.  
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 A second limitation is our classification of depth and breadth. Knowledge is not 
amenable to simple classifications, and so any attempt to classify is fraught with dangers. We do 
not argue that our metrics are perfect here, but only that they might be better than what has gone 
before. We are well aware that our notion of depth and breadth might not be applicable to all 
technology industries, especially those based on technologies that are not subject to clear patents.  
The third limitation is the way we have gone about estimating our model. When we 
hypothesized the impacts of competition on alliance formation, we expected to see an absence of 
alliances. However, we made no direct observation of the pool of alliance partners, and hence no 
observation either of the absence of partners. We have made an assumption that, at any time, 
there is a very large stock of potential partner firms available to make alliances in this field, and 
so the failure to measure the pool is unlikely to result in bias. However, we recognize that this 
might need to be checked. Ideally it would be better to identify the potential partners for each 
firm, and consider what happened to the rejected suitors. The industry is too numerous to have a 
complete population survey, but one could approach this problem by creating a population of all 
the firms that succeeded in having a partnership in our data-base and then tracing each firm’s 
technology base and identifying who would be its strongest competitors, and then compare their 
choices of partner with those of the potential competitor set. This would clearly be no easy task: 
there would be more than 600 firms in the sample, coupled with year variables, and we would 
need to identify the firms individually and collect data on their patent position for each year, in 
each patent class, which would result in some 6,000 firm-year observations. We suggest that our 
failure to undertake such work is not likely to have resulted in bias, and is best left for another 
research project.  
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One direction for future work is to investigate alliance formation from the perceptions of 
the managers involved. Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989) have pointed out that 
competition is as much a cognitive phenomenon as one driven by economic positions: in the 
Scottish Knitwear industry, firms were more oriented to competing with like firms than dealing 
with the tangible threats of Italian producers such as Benetton. Thus, the ability of organizations 
to respond to a competitive threat or a collaboration opportunity is likely to depend on their top 
managers’ perceptions. The future research in this line could use surveys to measure such 
cognitive variables as managers’ risk-aversion proclivity, confidence and sensitivity to change, 
and either position these variables as mediators between knowledge feature variables and 
alliance decisions, or test the moderating role of the cognitive variables to explain why managers 
in some companies tend to form more alliances than those in the other companies with similar 
knowledge features. 
Finally, Lucia Piscitello and her colleagues (Piscitello, 2000; 2004; Cantwell & Piscitello, 
2000; 2005) have provided distinctive concepts of technological breadth (upstream inputs) and 
product breadth (downstream outputs). In particular, she has argued (2000) that a high level of 
interconnection between the two constructs increases the company’s corporate coherence and 
eventually its economic performance. Taking this direction, future research could investigate 
how product breadth, rather than technological breadth, might influence alliance formation – or, 
indeed, how the interaction of the two constructs might jointly influence alliance formation. 
CONCLUSION  
In the 21st century, knowledge management is the core competency for many companies, and 
how to learn in a fast, safe and cheap way is a critical question for large incumbent firms. This 
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study shows that the quality of firm knowledge base, as measured by depth and breadth, has 
sophisticated influences on technology collaboration. When a firm has broad knowledge that is 
centralized in a single location, it seems that it can overcome the obstacles of knowledge leakage 
and use alliances to strengthen its position even further; in contrast, a firm that has deep 
knowledge base that is decentralized in many locations may feel vulnerable to alliances and have 
to find other ways to sustain their advantages.  
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 1. We also used another method to calculate depth by dividing “knowledge capital” by the 
breadth of knowledge base. The variable “knowledge capital” is calculated by counting the 
number of patents granted to the firm weighted by the number of technological sub-classes 
each patent covered. It measures the average effort a firm makes in each technological class. 
We tested the hypotheses with this measure, and the results showed no substantial differences 
from those using the measure reported in the text.   
 
2. Argyres and Silverman (2004) categorized R&D organizational structure into 5 levels: 
centralized, centralized hybrid, balanced hybrid, decentralized hybrid and decentralized. We 
adopted only 2 levels, because of the lack of information at the same level of detail for the 
European and Japanese firms.  
 
3. Of the 78 companies, only Abbott substantially changed their R&D organizational structures 
during 1999-2001. Abbott formed the Global Pharmaceutical Research and Development 
(GPRD) organization, unifying all research and development at Abbott into a single in year 
2000 (http://www.abbott.com/GPRD/GPRD_AboutUs.htm), and its basic research alliance 
increased from average 3/year to 11 in year 2001. We therefore treated “centralization” for 
Abbott in year 2000 and 2001 as missing data in the regressions. 
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TABLE 1: 
Descriptive Analysis and Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Research  
   alliances t  1.000            
2. R&D intensity  
  (1,000US$) -0.155*  1.000           
3. Size  0.305* -0.200*  1.000          
4. Europe  0.151* -0.212*  0.484*  1.000         
5. Japan -0.364*  0.556* -0.212* -0.396*  1.000        
6. Pharmaceuticals  0.178*  0,217* 0.265*  0.095* -0.129* 1.000       
7. Research  
  alliances t-1  0.727* -0.204*  0.306* -0.386*  0.141* 0.169*  1.000      
8. Commercial  
alliances t-1  0.429* -0.120  0.319* -0.217*  0.203* 0.176*  0.398*  1.000     
9. Stock market  0.175*  0.219*  0.011  0.000  0.000 0.211*  0.194*  0.225* 1.000    
10. Depth -0.090*  0.041  0.029  0.020  0.089* 0.095* -0.101 -0.086 0.079  1.000   
11. Breadth  0.208*  0.004  0.461*  0.188*  0.227* 0.086*  0.205*  0.268* -0.049  0.149*  1.000  
12. Centralization  0.176*  0.143*  0.137* -0.166*  0.052 0.062  0.172*  0.069 0.000 -0.016  .160* 1.000 
Mean  1.815  1.064  9.186  0.151  0.445 0.813  1.595  1.139 0.266  1.056 
 
15.438 0.788 
Std. Dev.  3.113  2.069  1.817  0.358  0.497 0.400  3.218  1.980 0.184  0.383  5.632 0.409 
Minimum  0.000  0.009  2.710  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.091  0.100  2.000 0.000 
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Negative Binomial Regression of the Impact of Firm Knowledge Base, R&D 
Organizational Structure on the Number of New Research Alliances Formation 
a 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Controls      
   
R&D intensity t-1 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.201*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.203*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 
 [0.048] [0.047] [0.044] [0.045] [0.044] [0.042] [0.041] [0.046] 
Size t-1 0.141* 0.143* 0.144* 0.129* 0.120* 0.142* 0.139* 0.122* 
 [0.059] [0.055] [0.052] [0.054] [0.055] [0.051] [0.057] [0.051] 
Europe -0.198 -0.194 -0.161 -0.176 -0.155 -0.139 -0.180 -0.138 
 [0.294] [0.280] [0.272] [0.274] [0.279] [0.271] [0.277] [0.263] 
Japan -2.061*** -2.060*** -2.132*** -1.997*** -1.993*** -2.022*** -2.011*** -2.065*** 
 [0.298] [0.284] [0.273] [0.284] [0.283] [0.276] [0.281] [0.243] 
Y t-1 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] 
Commercialization 
alliance
 t-1 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.012* 0.013* 0.013* 0.012* 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] 
Stock market
 t-1 0.617** 0.617** 0.619** 0.616** 0.615** 0.616** 0.616** 0.617** 
 [0.216] [0.217] [0.218] [0.215] [0.216] [0.216] [0.217] [0.212] 
Pharmaceuticals 0.539* 0.544* 0.497* 0.534* 0.496* 0.476+ 0.465+ 0.550 
 [0.259] [0.245] [0.240] [0.244] [0.243] [0.241] [0.243] [0.242] 
Firm knowledge base features   
 
 
   
 
Depth t-1  -0.338*   -0.325* -0.331* -0.288* -0.330* 
  [0.164]   [0.161] [0.159] [0.147] [0.161] 
Breadth t-1   0.076***  0.075*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.083*** 
   [0.015]  [0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] 
Centralization    0.916*** 0.874*** 0.903*** 0.885*** 0.895*** 
    [0.281] [0.274] [0.278] [0.276] [0.279] 
Depth t-1 * 
Centralization      0.181** 
 
0.182** 
      [0.061]  [0.061] 
Breadth t-1 * 
Centralization      
 
-0.079** -0.076** 
       [0.026] [0.028] 
No. of firms 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
No. of observation 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 
Log-likelihood -923.39 -915.32 -913.09 -910.33 -896.99  -879.05 -876.72 -858.34 
 
a.
 S.E. in brackets.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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FIGURE 1:  
Split-plot Analysis of the Interaction Effects of R&D 
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FIGURE 2:  
Split-plot Analysis of the Interaction Effects of R&D 
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